Let Carolyn Jane Bohler inspire you to consider a wide range of images of God in order to refine how you imagine God to have and use power, and how God wills ...

An increase in the number of companies that publish corporate social responsibility (CSR) statements, and a rise in their ‘sustainability’ research, reflects a growing acceptance that broad ethical considerations are key for any type of company. However, little is known about how companies consider moral objectives for their research and development (R&D) activities, or the basis upon which these activities are chosen. This research involves qualitative investigation into Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) in the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) industry, (...) comprising 30 in-depth, pan-European interviews with key personnel in the industry, and focus groups with employees at 14 different companies. Through investigation of the ‘responsible’ activities these companies currently undertake, we shed light on the types of moral goals they set and their underlying ethical standpoints. By reviewing both the responsible innovation and sustainability discourses, and presenting phenomenological evidence, we demonstrate that companies have adopted some aspects of RRI, even though it might not be recognised as such. Our findings indicate that these innovators recognise some of the ethical and societal concerns associated with their activities but their approach is often piecemeal; primary focus is upon the most immediate issues and on legal compliance, to the detriment of broader societal issues and wider challenges. We recommend explicit mechanisms that draw upon established ethical thought and practical academic work to improve companies' abilities to carry out their sustainability activities, and incorporate them into a responsible business strategy. We conclude with recommendations for innovators, corporate research and development, and policy. (shrink)

Sensitivity to interpersonal timing was assessed in mother–infant interaction. In Study 1, 3-month-old infants interacted with their mothers over television and the mothers’ audio-visual presentation was either live or temporally delayed by 1 second. Infants gazed longer when the mother was presented live compared to delayed by 1 second, indicating that they detected the temporal delay. In Study 2, mothers interacted with their 3-month-old infants over television and the infants’ audio-visual presentation was either live or temporally delayed by 1 second. (...) Mothers’ behavior was not altered by a 1-second delay in their infants’ behavior compared to a live presentation. In Study 3 and 4, the results were replicated with 6-month-old infants. Whereas infants detected the temporal delay in maternal responses, mothers likely adjusted to the delay in infant behavior. The discussion focuses on the role of interpersonal timing for detecting social contingency in dyadic and triadic communication. (shrink)

The process of adopting a child is “not for the faint of heart.” This is what we were told the first time we, as a couple, began this process. Part of the challenge lies in fulfilling the licensing requirements for adoption, which, beyond the usual home study, can include mandatory participation in parenting classes. The question naturally arises for many people who are subjected to these requirements whether they are morally justified. We tackle this question in this paper. In our (...) view, while strong reasons exist in favour of licensing adoptive parents, these reasons support the licensing not only of adoptive parents, but of all or some subset of so-called “natural” parents as well. We therefore conclude that the status quo with respect to parental licensing, according to which only adoptive parents need to be licensed, is morally unjustified. (shrink)

The relationship between career counselling and widening participation is increasingly capturing the attention of educational researchers, especially those interested in its social justice implications. International research on first-in-family students demonstrates the continual class-based barriers they are faced with which influence their progression into and through higher education. Career counselling has an important role to play in both supporting first-in-family students to not only enter university but also set them on a career trajectory which allows them to fulfil their aspirations. However, (...) access to effective forms of career counselling remains fragmented and highly dependent on social class. This article explores how first-in-family students engage in what we call ‘DIY career counselling,’ where they draw on their informal networks and the internet to enhance their understanding of their future prospects and possible trajectories. Their efforts suggest a strong desire to learn more about what university can offer them and how they can position themselves advantageously in the job market; furthermore, their efforts also suggest a consumerist awareness that the career counselling on offer in their secondary schools was lacking. (shrink)

One understanding of conscience dominates bioethical discussion about conscience. On this view, to have a conscience is to be compelled to act in accordance with one’s own moral values for the sake of one’s “integrity,” where integrity is understood as inner or psychological unity. Conscience is deemed valuable because it promotes this quality. In this paper, I describe the dominant view, attempt to show that it is flawed, and sketch a positive alternative to it. In my opinion, conscience often fails (...) to promote inner unity (regardless of the degree of inner unity we have in mind); acting with a conscience leaves many people broken rather than unified. A better view about the value of conscience is that having a conscience encourages morally responsible agency. My goal is to prove that this alternative explains better what it means to value conscience in health care and the extent to which we ought to value it. (shrink)

The introduction to a special issue of the journal Bioethics that we edited.

This article takes up the work of Judith Butler in order to present a vision of ethics that avoids two common yet problematic positions: on the one hand, the skeptical position that ethical norms are so constitutive of who we are that they are ultimately impossible to assess and, on the other hand, the notion that we are justified in our commitment to any ethical norm that appears foundational to our identity. With particular attention to the trajectory of Butler’s project (...) from The Psychic Life of Power to Giving an Account of Oneself, the article discusses the shortcomings of these two positions and the virtues of the alternative account that Butler develops during this period. (shrink)

The main aims of the paper are to explain how objectification admits of degrees and why a significant portion of the objectification of women in contemporary Western society - objectification that contributes to their oppression - is what I call "partial objectification." To acknowledge the full range of objectification in women's lives, feminists need a theory of how objectification can be degreed. They need to be able to say that women can be both bosom and legitimate job candidate, both breeder (...) and health care patient, both sex object and intimate partner. (shrink)

This comment responds to Maul’s (2012) article evaluating the validity evidence and argument for the Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT) as a measure of emotional intelligence (EI). We suggest that Maul’s standards for establishing validity evidence are unrealistically high, and may not be met by other established psychometric tests. As an example, we show that evidence for the validity of Raven’s Progressive Matrices (RPM) is of a similar standard to the MSCEIT.

Through close readings of Frost's poetry and often ignored prose, Mark Richardson argues that Frost's debates with Van Wyck Brooks, Malcolm Cowley, and H. L. Mencken informed his poetics and his poetic style just as much as did his deep identification with earlier writers like Emerson and William James.

One cannot expect an exact answer to the question “What are the possible structures of space?”, but rough answers to it impact central debates within philosophy of space and time. Recently Gordon Belot has suggested that a rough answer takes the class of metric spaces to represent the possible structures of space. This answer has intuitive appeal, but I argue, focusing on topological characterizations of dimension, examples of prima facie space-like mathematical spaces that have pathological dimension properties, and endorsing a (...) principle of plenitude for possibility, that we get a different rough answer: either the class of metrizable spaces or the class of separable metrizable spaces are possible structures of space. (shrink)

Skin is one of the most thoroughly studied epithelia and can be used as a model for transcriptional control of epithelial differentiation. In particular, the stages of epidermal development and differentiation from a simple epithelium are well characterized. Temporal gene expression during development can be used to assign roles for transcription factors in epidermal differentiation. Approaches to understanding transcriptional regulation in epidermis include extensive promoter analysis and expression studies, in some cases coupled to functional studies. This work has not produced (...) any consensus about the importance of any particular factor or class of factors in epidermal specification. There is, as yet, nothing similar to the myo D family of tissue‐specific and cell‐type determining factors in epidermis. These studies, however, have revealed much about control of the differentiation process in epidermis. Most recently, there has been a suggestion that epithelial transcription can be influenced directly by the status of the adhesion complexes at the cell surface, providing a direct link between one of the distinguishing features of the epithelial state and gene transcription. (shrink)

Appeals to justice are made both to support and to refute the moral permissibility of euthanasia. This article provides a sketch of the major justice-basedarguments and proposes that a communitarian and virtue ethic underlies the ethos of nursing and leads to the conclusion that euthanasia is the opposite of justice. Justice says that nursing should reject euthanasia and remain true to the wisdom that has consistently informed the traditions and practices of the nursing community through history—practices inspired by charity, dependent (...) on prudence, and strengthened and sustained by the practice of virtue. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 9.2 (Summer 2009): 279–292. (shrink)

Is research aimed at preserving the fertility of cancer patients morally justified? A satisfying answer to this question is missing from the literature on oncofertility. Rather than providing an answer, which is impossible to do in a short space, this chapter explains what it would take to provide such justification.

This paper discusses recent evidence that violations of core knowledge offer special learning opportunities for infants and young children. Children make predictions about the world from the youngest ages. When their fail to match observed data, they show an enhanced drive to seek and retain new information about entities that violated their expectations. Finally, the authors draw comparisons between children and adults, and with other species, to explore how surprise shapes thought more broadly.

This open access collection of AI ethics case studies is the first book to present real-life case studies combined with commentaries and strategies for overcoming ethical challenges. Case studies are one of the best ways to learn about ethical dilemmas and to achieve insights into various complexities and stakeholder perspectives. Given the omnipresence of AI ethics in academic, policy and media debates, the book will be suitable for a wide range of audiences, from scholars of different disciplines (e.g. AI science, (...) ethics, politics, philosophy, economics) to policy-makers, lobbying NGOs, teachers and the educated public. (shrink)

Transcendental Pragmatics and Discourse Ethics. Elements and Perspectives of Apel's Discourse-Philosophy. The author follows Apel's intellectual biography and shows the conception of a critique of meaning qua ‘reflection upon the discourse within the discourse’ to be the centre of Apel's language-pragmatic ‘Transformation of Philosophy’. Beginning with an explication of the situation of a speaker/thinker, especially of the situation of a philosophising speaker/thinker, Apel reconstructs a two fold apriori of communication: Every thought is situated within the context of a particular, historically (...) evolved, community of language and interaction. At the same time, however, the validity-claims of thoughts transcend the context of their origin towards an unlimited community of argumentation. On the basis of the first apriori Apel criticises the methodical solipsism as well as the objectivism of modern philosophy and theory of science. Drawing upon the second apriori he develops a universalist critique of meaning of relativism and contextualism. In the sixties and seventies Apel worked out a differentiated theory of the – more or less – communicatively cognizing humanities and set it apart from the theory of the causal-explanatory natural sciences, thus challenging the objectivism of a Theory of Unified Science. Building upon this work Transcendental Pragmatics, as developed by Apel and others, sets philosophy primarily two tasks: firstly, a internal reconstruction of argumentative discourse as the situation of speech and thought which seeks to elucidate the conditions of the meaningfulness, i. e. the presuppositions, of discourse. These presuppositions comprise, thus Apel with Habermas, the four validity-claims to intelligibility, sincerety/credibility, truth and normative rightness/legitimacy. Their moral content consists, thus Apel, not only in the recognition of the equality of all beings capable of discursive reasoning but also in their recognition of a co-responsibility for the realizability of discourses and of responsibility. The author argues that the existence of a co-responsibility of this kind is indisputable because the discursive claims to validity are intertwined with a set of ‘primordial promises of dialogue’. Only with the elucidation and explication of these promises can the reconstruction of the internal conditions of discourse be completed.The second task of a pragmatics of argumentation isthe strict resp. actual reflection of the thinker upon the presuppositions of the discourse in which he currently engages. This reflection has a Socratic character and can only be done in the form of discussion and debate with critics of the reconstruction. In this context, the author proposes a method of Socratic reflection upon the presuppositions of dialogue which suspends the usual, theoretically oriented, attitude of the scientist and the philosopher in favour of an actual reflective attitude. Within a dialogue with a sceptic who doubts one of the results of the internal reconstruction of dialogical presuppositions, say X, it is tested whether his doubt as to the unrestricted validity of X can be understood as a sincere contribution to the current dialogue or whether this particular sceptical thesis does not make sense, because it is incompatible with the role of a sincere participant of argumentation which, after all, the sceptic cannot refuse to claim for himself.Finally the author explains Apel's characterization of the tension between “Discourse and Responsibility”. In the course of discussions with Max Weber, Lawrence Kohlberg, Hans Jonas et al., Apel formulates and justifies an ethics of responsibility and gives an affirmative answer to the crucial question of whether the fulfilment of the moral obligations connected with the recognition of co-responsibility can be demanded within the non-dialogical circumstances of social reality. Apel's answer employs the idea of counter-strategies which are morally legitimate in virtue of their being worthy of argumentative consensus. (shrink)

Some of the oldest and deepest questions in philosophy fall under the umbrella of consciousness and mind: What is the mind and how is it related to the body? What provides our thoughts with content? How is consciousness related to the natural world? Do we have distinctive causal powers? Analytic philosophers have made significant progress on these and related problems in the last century. Given the high volume of work on such topics, this chapter is necessarily selective. It offers major (...) touchstones but is slanted in favor of work that touches base with the sciences. The chapter starts by describing the progression of thought on the mind-body problem, from dualism and behaviorism to non-reductive materialism. It then describes the problem of intentionality, with a focus on partial solutions from Dretske and Millikan, ending with a brief discussion of 4E theories of mental content. The section on the problem of consciousness starts with the well-known knowledge and modal arguments before describing some attempted initial solutions, such as eliminative materialism and panpsychism. Finally, there is a brief section on agency and free will, which focuses on the link between free will and consciousness. (shrink)

This book discusses the concept of immanent critique, i. e. whether there is a form of critique which neither just applies empirically accepted standards nor independently justified norms but rather reconstructs norms which are immanent to social practices. -/- It surveys both political theories of criticism (Walzer, Taylor, MacIntyre) and contemporary critical theories (Habermas, Honneth) for how they describe such forms of critique and develops a new model of immanent critique. For this purpose, it takes up both contemporary social ontology (...) theories and the discussion about rule-following. The book argues that we can speak of immanent rules as far as persons can practically recognize each other as members of rule-governed practices if they attribute each other defeasible normative authority. -/- Finally, it describes the consequences of the adoption of such a model for our description of a practice of critique and analyzes both first-order immanent critique and the second-order critique of reification. (shrink)